Abstract Rising software complexity in aerospace systems makes them very difficult to analyze and prepare for all possible fault scenarios at design time; therefore, classical runtime fault tolerance techniques such as self-checking pairs and triple modular redundancy are used. However, several recent incidents have made it clear that existing software fault tolerance techniques alone are not sufficient. To improve system dependability, simpler, yet formally specified and verified run-time monitoring, diagnosis, and fault mitigation capabilities are needed. Such architectures are already in use for managing the health of vehicles and systems. Software health management is the application of these techniques to software systems. In this paper, we briefly describe the software health management techniques and architecture developed by our research group. The foundation of the architecture is a real-time component framework (built upon ARINC-653 platform services) that defines a model of computation for software components. Dedicated architectural elements: the Component Level Health Manager (CLHM) and System Level Health Manager (SLHM) provide the health management services: anomaly detection, fault source isolation, and fault mitigation. The SLHM includes a diagnosis engine that (1) (2) reasons about cascading fault effects in the system, and (3) isolates the fault source component(s). Thereafter, the appropriate system-level mitigation action is taken. The main focus of this article is the description of the fault mitigation architecture that uses goal-based deliberative reasoning to determine the best mitigation actions for recovering the system from the identified failure mode.
Introduction
Software has become the key enabler for a number of core capabilities and services in modern systems. It is also increasingly used for system integration [35] . For example, a modern car contains about 20 million lines of embedded code, while just the flight controls avionics of modern aircraft (e.g., F-22) contains 1.7-5.7 million lines of code [10] . The scale of these systems imposes many challenges to ensure correct and proper behavior, especially in avionics where software malfunctions have caused a number of incidents in the past, including but not limited to those referred to in these reports: [3, 4, 23, 37] . In [46] Sha provides an excellent discussion on the complexity in avionics software.
Safety-critical software systems, while in operation, must be able to adapt to and mitigate the effects of latent faults in their implementation, in software, in hardware, or in the larger system, even if those faults appear simultaneously. State-of-the-art techniques for safety-critical systems involve applying software fault tolerance principles, methods and tools to ensure that a system can survive software defects that manifest themselves at run-time [9, 29, 30, 41, 51] .
However, several incidents mentioned above indicate the inadequacy of these techniques and point to the need for additional approaches that apply anomaly detection, fault source identification (i.e., diagnosis), fault-effect mitigation, and fault prognosis, as defined and used in System Health Management of complex engineering systems [25, 39] . One such approach has been termed Software Health Management. It is a run-time technique that includes fault detection, isolation, and mitigation activities to remove fault effects [49] . Recent work in this area includes [6, 31, 40, 45] .
We have developed an architecture and supporting modelbased tools for implementing software health management functions for component-based systems. The foundation of the architecture is a real-time component framework (built upon an ARINC-653 platform) that defines a specific model of computation for software components [14] . This framework uses the concepts of temporal isolation, spatial isolation, and strict temporal deadlines from ARINC-653 and combines them with the well-defined component interaction patterns derived from the CORBA Component Model (CCM) [53] . Health management in the framework is performed on two levels: the Component Level Health Manager (CLHM) provides localized and limited service for managing the health of individual components, while a System Level Health Manager (SLHM) manages the health of the overall system. SLHM employs a diagnosis engine based on a Timed Failure Propagation Graph (TFPG) [1] . The TFPG model is automatically synthesized from the model of components and their connectivity; the engine reasons about fault-effect cascades in the system and isolates the fault source component(s). This is possible because the data and behavioral dependencies (and hence the fault propagation) across the assembly of software components can be deduced from the well-defined and restricted set of interaction patterns supported by the framework [15] . In the past, we showed how system-wide mitigation can be performed based on reactive timed state machines specified by the designer at system integration time [31] . However, one of the problems with this approach to fault mitigation at the system level is the complexity of the specifications required to cover all possible combinations of failure scenarios.
This paper describes an approach to system level fault mitigation using deliberative, goal-oriented reasoning to identify alternate component configurations that can restore the desired system functionality. We build upon our earlier work [16] to provide design-time support for the concise specification of functional goals, the redundancy available to support these goals and component-specific operational requirements. We describe the run-time framework and its use of off-the-shelf constraint solvers to search for alternate configurations that can restore system functionality. The specific case of using Boolean Satisfiability (SAT) solvers is discussed in detail, along with results from illustrative examples and a larger case study. We also outline the steps for integrating pseudo-Boolean solvers into the run-time framework.
The outline of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents background material from our earlier work in the context of Software Health Management. Section 3 motivates the need to move from a prescriptive to a deliberative, searchbased reasoning. The design time and run-time support for the deliberative strategy are discussed in Sects. 4 and 5, respectively. Section 6 focuses on the representation of the problem for use with Boolean Satisfiability (SAT) solvers and showcases the results using a specific SAT solver with small illustrative examples and a larger case study. Section 7 outlines the encoding required for integrating pseudo-Boolean solvers. Section 8 contains a discussion of the work. Section 9 presents related work and Sect. 10 concludes.
Background: software health management
System Level Health Management and fault tolerance approaches often rely on the notion of interacting components. Hence, it is natural to apply these concepts of health management to systems built from software components, where each software component is developed and tested individually, and then monitored and managed at run-time. In our work, the first step was to develop and implement such a component model.
A real-time component framework
The ARINC-653 component model (ACM) is built upon the services of ARINC-653: an industry standard for safetycritical operating systems [2] . ARINC-653 systems group processes 1 into spatially and temporally separated partitions, with one or more partitions assigned to each module (i.e., a processor), and one or more modules forming a system. Spatial partitioning ensures exclusive use of a memory region by an ARINC partition. It also guarantees that a faulty process in a partition cannot ruin the data structures of other processes in other partitions, isolating, for instance, lowcriticality vehicle management software components from safety-critical flight control software components. Temporal partitioning ensures exclusive use of processing resources by a partition. A fixed periodic schedule is used by the realtime operating system (RTOS) to share the resources between partitions. This deterministic scheduling ensures that each partition is allowed exclusive access to the processor within its predetermined execution interval. It also guarantees that when the predetermined execution interval of a partition is over, the partition's execution will be interrupted and the partition will be placed into a dormant state, and the next partition in the schedule order will be granted exclusive access to the processor.
The component model
The ARINC-653 component model (ACM) allows developers to group a number of ARINC-653 processes into a reusable component. A component is a group of processes that share state but do not interact directly. However, components do interact with each other via well-defined interaction patterns (chosen from a fixed set), facilitated by ports. In ACM, a component can have four kinds of external ports for interactions: publishers, consumers, facets (provided interfaces 2 ) and receptacles (required interfaces), as shown in Fig. 1 .
Each port has an interface type: a named collection of methods, for provided and required ports, or an event type: a data structure, for publishers and subscribers. The component can interact with other components through synchronous call/return interfaces (associated with provided and required ports), and/or asynchronous publish/subscribe event connections (assigned to publisher and consumer ports). Additionally, a component can host internal methods that are periodically triggered. Most of these interactions borrow 2 An interface is a collection of related methods.
concepts from other software component frameworks, most notably from the CCM [53] .
Component operations
The operations of a component are governed by the operations of its ports and internal methods. While the framework provides the generic code to support the execution of the ports and methods, the component developer implements the business logic for each port and method.
Further, as the ACM framework is designed for hard realtime systems, each component port and internal method is statically assigned to a dedicated ARINC-653 process. 3 Since a component could involve multiple ARINC-653 processes, the access to component state is synchronized through a component-wide lock. This ensures that at most one ARINC-653 process per component is active at any time. In other words, a component is always single-threaded. Please see [14] for a detailed description of the component model and its operation.
Component execution states
A component can be in one of the following three execution states: active, inactive and semi-active. When a component is in the inactive state, none of the component ports (i.e., processes) are operational. In the other two states, the component is fully (active) or partially (semi-active) operational. In the active state, all the component ports perform their tasks. In the semi-active state, only the consumer and required ports of a component are operational, the publisher and provided ports are not.
System development with ACM
Typically, system development is carried out in two phases. In the component development phase, the components are developed and verified independently, and stored in a repository for reuse. Often, component developers organize various components into subsystems, which can then be reused to form systems. The second phase is system integration. This includes modeling and configuring the system architecture, as well as deploying the components on computing hosts. The framework implementing the ACM includes a Linuxbased run-time environment (that includes an ARINC-653 emulator) and a domain-specific modeling environment with associated design tools. 4 Figure 2 shows the assembly for a notional GPS system with a redundant set of Sensor/GPS component pairs: Sensor plus GPS, and Sensor2 plus GPS2. Here, each sensor component (i.e., Sensor and Sensor2) publishes an event every 4 s which is consumed by the associated GPS component (i.e., GPS and GPS2) at that rate. Thereafter, each GPS component publishes an event, which is sporadically consumed by the Navigation Display (NavDisplay) component. The Navigation Display component fetches location data from the GPS and GPS2 components using the provided port called 'gps'.
Example
In the initial setup of the assembly, the Sensor, GPS, and NavDisplay components are in the active state, allowing the Navigation Display to receive updates from the active Sensor and GPS components. The redundant Sensor2 and GPS2 components are set to stand-by mode, ready to replace the functioning Sensor and GPS components in the case of a problem. Sensor2 is set to the active state, and GPS2 is set to the semi-active state, allowing GPS2 to update its state by collecting data through its active consumer port from the Sensor2 component. Being in semi-active state, GPS2's publisher and provided ports do not service the NavDisplay component.
Failure scenarios and anomaly monitoring
We consider two primary failure sources during the operation of each component port: (a) a concurrency fault and (b) a latent bug in the source code associated with the port. The concurrency fault is caused when the port is unable to obtain the lock associated with the component, leading to delayed or lack of execution of the port. On the other hand, the latent bug in the source code could lead to an incorrect execution in the component port. Both of the above fault sources can lead to several secondary anomalies in either the same component or in a connected component. In the ACM framework, the design tools allow the system designer to deploy monitors, which can be configured to detect deviations from expected behaviors in the component operations. The following discrepancies can be currently identified using these monitors:
* Lock timeout The component model requires that only one component operation can be executed at any time.
In order to achieve this, all component operations synchronize on a component state mutex. If the ARINC-653 process of the component operation does not obtain the lock within a specified time, an anomaly is declared. The value of the timeout is either set to a default value equal to the deadline of the process associated with the component operation or can be specified by the system designer. * Data validity violation (only applicable to consumers):
All data exchanged between publishers and consumers have an expiration age. This is also known as the validity period in ARINC-653 sampling ports. We have extended this to be applicable to all types of component consumer ports, both periodic and aperiodic. * Pre-condition violation Developers can specify conditions that should be checked before an component operation is executed. These conditions can be expressed over the current value or the historical change in the value, or rate of change of values of variables (with respect to the previously known values for same parameter), such as 1. the message in asynchronous calls, 2. the function parameters of synchronous calls, and 3. the (monitored) state variables of the component.
* User code failure Any error or exception raised in the user code while a component operation is being executed can be abstracted by the software developer as an error condition which can then be reported to the framework. Any unreported error is recognized as a potentially unobservable discrepancy. * Post-condition violation Similar to pre-condition violations, but these conditions are checked after the execution of the operation associated with the component port. * Deadline violation Any process execution must finish within the specified deadline.
These monitors can be specified via (1) attributes of model elements (e.g., deadline, data validity, lock timeout) and (2) via a simple expression language (e.g., conditions). While deadline, data validity and lock timeout are defined as relative timeouts expressed in seconds, the conditions (both preconditions and post-conditions) are written as logical expressions using the conventional logical and comparison operations over (1) current value (of an argument, say x), (2) delta value (change in value since the last sample, written as delta(x)), or (3) rate value (rate of change, written as rate(x)).
Code generators included in the design tools produce the appropriate (C++) code for the monitors. All monitors, other than those observing deadline violations, are evaluated in the same thread as executing the component port. The monitors detecting deadline violations are run on framework threads, so that they can observe the CPU resource usage of the concerned port while that is executing. A violation detected by any of the monitors is considered as an anomaly and is reported to the health management system.
The components in the assembly model ( Fig. 2 ) have been instrumented with monitors to detect anomalies related to resource usage (detected as deadline violations), user code (detected as user code violations), age of the received data (detected as data validity violations), as well as violations on the contracts (pre-conditions and post-conditions) for exchanging data between the ports [15, 18] . They also have the capability to mitigate any problems that could arise because of the anomaly, but this mitigation action may not remove the primary source of failure. Realizing the benefits and limitations of each strategy, we implemented a two-level health management strategy in our framework: the component level that is local to a component, and the system level that includes the entire assembly of components. While the CLHM is specified by the component developers, the SLHM is provided by the system integrator.
Local mitigation
The Component Level Health Manager(CLHM) provides localized and limited functionality for managing the health of a component. The CLHM is modeled as a timed state machine that can be customized for each component. It is triggered by anomalies detected by the monitors (as described in the previous section) deployed inside the component and reacts with the appropriate local-mitigation action [15] .
In addition to these monitors that detect and report anomalies, monitors to report the starting and stopping of a port's process can also be selected. These monitors aid in building observers to track the activation sequences of component processes (ports) and report any deviations from the expected sequence. Observers are also modeled as parallel state machines within the CLHM, with one machine acting as an observer and another as the health manager. Each of the parallel state machines could be triggered by their relevant monitor events. While the observer tracks the state evolution, the health manager takes appropriate mitigation actions for the anomalies detected. When an anomaly is detected in the observer, it triggers the health manager portion of the CLHM state machine and that takes the appropriate mitigation action.
A detailed discussion on the local-mitigation actions of the CLHM as well as example of CLHM models customized to react to violations in user code, deadlines, pre-conditions, post-conditions and data validity in the Sensor, GPS and NavDisplay components are presented in [15, 18] . The anomalies observed and the mitigation actions taken by the CLHM are local to the component. The CLHM provides a 'quick fix' and could be effective in handling temporary local faults as well as arresting the fault propagation. A system-wide mitigation engine would be ill-suited to react to every local anomaly.
Diagnosis and system-level mitigation
In component-based systems, anomalies in a component can be local, or they can be the result of a secondary effect caused by an anomaly in an upstream component. Identifying this pattern is important to isolate the root failure source. While the component-level mitigation code (provided by the component developer) can quickly react to the local anomaly, this does not guarantee that the primary source of failure is mitigated. A system-wide mitigation engine is better suited to identify and mitigate the real fault source, especially when the failure effects cascade across component boundaries.
The SLHM in ACM relies on a TFPG model [1] that captures the failure modes (fault sources), discrepancies (anomalies) and the failure propagation among them, across the entire system. The TFPG model for the complete component assembly can be automatically generated based on the knowledge of the components and their ports, the intra-component data and control flow dependencies between the ports of a component, and the inter-component interactions as captured in the assembly model. A detailed discussions of the TFPG model templates for the component ports, as well as the failure propagation patterns between the ports (publisher and consumer, provided and required ports) are presented in [15, 18] .
The SLHM engine uses the information from the local CLHMs (anomalies observed and mitigation actions taken) in the context of the TFPG models to locate the possible fault source component(s) and identify the possible set of mitigation actions that could restore the health of the system. The execution of the SLHM requires augmentation of the ACM assembly with three special SLHM components: Alarm Aggregator, Diagnosis Engine, and SystemHM Mitigation Engine, as shown in Fig. 3 . These components are described briefly in the following paragraphs.
The Alarm Aggregator is responsible for collecting and aggregating inputs from the CLHMs (local alarms and the corresponding mitigation actions). This information is processed using a moving window with a length of two hyperperiods of the complete partition schedule. The events are sorted based on their time of occurrence and then supplied to the diagnosis engine.
The Diagnosis Engine contains an instance of a TFPG reasoning engine. The reasoner uses the TFPG model (autogenerated for the given component assembly) to isolate the most plausible fault source: a component whose fault could explain the observations, i.e., anomalies detected and the CLHM commands issued. The diagnosis result, which is a list of one or more faulty components, is then reported to the SystemHM Mitigation Engine. The SystemHM Mitigation Engine receives the diagnosis results (the set of faulty components) and responds with an appropriate, system level command to mitigate the fault and its effects.
The system-level mitigation described in [18, 31] uses a reactive mitigation technique that employs a timed parallel state machine. Models captured the mitigation actions for each failure scenario in the following examples: a GPS system [18] and an Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) of an avionics suite [31] . The state machine models referred to the component states (i.e., component execution modes) and were triggered by the fault diagnosis report from the diagnosis engine. When the appropriate guard conditions (that are based on the fault state of one or more components) were satisfied, the mitigation actions (reconfiguration commands) were generated as part of the state transition. The new state (after the transition) reflected the component state (execution mode) after reconfiguration.
While the mitigation strategy based on the reactive timed state machine was effective, the prescriptive approach to system-level mitigation proved extremely cumbersome. In the following sections, we describe in detail our recent work on an alternate mitigation scheme based on a deliberative search strategy to restore the system functionality.
Shifting from a reactive to a deliberative mitigation strategy
The reactive mitigation strategy used a prescriptive model in which the mitigation action for each failure scenario in each component configuration needed to be modeled in a timed state machine model. While the use of hierarchical and parallel state machines helped reduce the complexity of the models, this prescriptive approach was still very tedious, cumbersome, and error-prone. The rest of this paper explores an alternate deliberative mitigation strategy and our results in applying this to System Level Health Management. The SLHM mitigation strategy based on a Deliberative Mitigation Engine is similar to the one with a Reactive Mitigation Engine in that it receives the diagnosis results (i.e., the list of identified faulty components) and responds with an appropriate set of system level commands to mitigate the fault and its effects. However, the similarity ends there. Unlike the reactive engine in which the mitigation action for every failure scenario had to be prescribed (in our case with a timed state machine model), the deliberative engine relies on models of system goals and functionalities and functionallocation models that identify the specific groups of components that provide the desired services. The deliberative engine identifies the functionalities affected by the faulty components and attempts to restore the failed (or degraded) functions by searching the function-allocation models for alternate component configurations.
The paradigm shift implied by this deliberative mitigation strategy required additional modeling and run-time support in the ACM framework. Design-time additions include support for models that capture the system goals, the redundancy available to support the desired functionality, and any component-specific operational requirements. Additionally, the SLHM layer should support a generic framework that can formulate the problem in a way that allows a constraint solver to search through the configuration space and identify alternate configurations to restore the functionality. The following sections describe in detail our approach to supporting such design and run-time frameworks that provide a mitigation engine based on reasoning. This section details the extensions made to the ACM modeling framework to support a deliberative, search-based mitigation strategy. The extensions include support for modeling:
(1) system functions as a functional decomposition tree, (2) redundancy available to support those functions in terms of function-allocation models, and (3) operational requirements for each component. In addition, this section also includes definitions of new properties and their semantics (as mathematical relations) that serve as the basis for formalizing the search problem used in the deliberative mitigation strategy.
Modeling system goals
At design time, the system designer enumerates the functional requirements and goals of a system in the form of a tree structure. Each tree represents a top-level function that the system must support in a specific mode of operation. The tree structure follows the functional decomposition of the system, where intermediate nodes denote sub-functions that are required to support a higher-level function, while the leaf nodes are primitive functions that cannot be decomposed further.
Fig. 4
Example of system functions for the GPS Assembly in Fig. 2 Figure 4 shows the functional requirement tree model for the GPS assembly shown in Fig. 2 . The figure shows the top-level function of the GPS assembly which is to determine the position of the vehicle in inertial space (Inertial Position), represented by the root. For this Inertial Position function to be active, both its child nodes, Body Acceleration Measurement and GPS Position, must be available. In a typical vehicle, the continuous tracking of the inertial position depends on the measurement of the acceleration of the concerned body (Body Acceleration Measurement) and a continuously updating filter (e.g., a Kalman filter) that calculates the vehicle's estimated position. For this filter to work correctly, it has to be regularly updated with high accuracy position data, provided by the function GPS Position.
Example

Semantics
The semantics of the functional requirement tree can be formally expressed in terms of an is Active Boolean attribute that is defined for each function. The is Active attribute for a function captures whether the specific functionality is actively provided by the system. Equation (1) captures the formal relationship between the is Active property of the functions in a functional requirement tree.
where f p is the root function and F is the set of all child functions.
Modeling the function allocation
The function-allocation model captures the logical group of components that can support a specific function or goal. The set of components related to a function can be hierarchically composed into the groups of the following types:
1. ALT Group: Exactly 1 of N components is required to support a function X. This is expressed as X → EXACTLY ( 
C N ).
Once specified, the function-allocation tree contains: (1) a system function as its root node, (2) groups as intermediate nodes, and (3) software components as the leaf nodes. Note that the ALT and M-of-N groups capture the redundancy available to provide the desired functionality. Figure 5 shows the function-allocation model for one of the functions in Fig. 4 using the components in the assembly depicted in Fig. 2 . The model indicates that providing the GPS Position function requires at least one of the two Groups: Group1 and Group2. This is represented by an MofN (1 of 2) Group. Further, it indicates that Group1 and Group2 are both AND groups. Hence, Group1 requires the services of all its child nodes: the Sensor and the GPS component. Likewise, Group2 requires the services of the Sensor2 and GPS2 components.
Example
Semantics
The formal relationship between the nodes (function, group, component) in the function-allocation model are captured in terms of two Boolean attributes: isU sable and is Active of each node of the tree. The is Active attribute represents if the node is currently active. The isU sable attribute represents whether the node is usable, i.e., it can provide the desired service. In the case of a software component, the is Active attribute is reflective of the component's execution state in the ACM framework (see 2.1.3). A component is active (is Active = true) when it is executing in an active mode in the ACM framework. The fault status of a component determines its usability. A component that is not faulty is regarded as usable (isU sable = true). 
The is Active attribute of a function and a group is determined by the is Active property of their child nodes. A function is considered active (is Active = true) when all of its child nodes in the function-allocation model are active. An AND group is active if and only if all of its children are active. An ALT group is usable if exactly one of its child is active. An MofN group is active if at least M children are active. Exactly the same set of rules apply for determining the isU sable property of a group and a function. These rules for determining the is Active and isU sable attributes are summarized in Tables 1 and 2 , respectively. Note that in these Tables (1, 2) , g means group and c means component. Operator child(x) returns the set of immediate children of x, and |.| is the cardinality operator.
Component operational requirement (COR) model
The function-allocation model described in the previous section relates a system function to one or more groups of components that can provide that function. As the component assembly models show, the interactions between a component's ports (publisher and consumer ports and required and provided ports) establish an inherent interdependency between these components. Based on these component interdependencies, a function-allocation model should exhaustively enumerate all the components required to support it. However, this can quickly turn into an error-prone and cumbersome task, duplicating the information already contained in the assembly model. In order to keep the functionallocation model concise and avoid duplicating information, the ACM modeling language supports the specification of a COR model for components.
For a component to be operational, the external dependencies of that component must be satisfied. In other words, its consumer and required ports need the services of corresponding publisher and provided ports, respectively. In an assembly model, a consumer port can be connected to multiple publishers and a required port can be connected to multiple provided ports.
The CORs of a component are implicitly captured in terms of its ports. A publisher is active if its parent component is active. A provided port is active if its parent component is active. A consumer is expected to actively receive and process data from only one of its suppliers: a publisher port. Therefore, a consumer port, c , is operational when the parent component of exactly one of the supplier publisher ports connected to c is active. 5 In ACM, each required port is expected to receive and process data from only one of its service providers: a provided port. Thus, a required port, r , is operational when the parent component of at least one of its service provider's provided ports connected to r is active.
Implicit and explicit COR model
While the implicit COR condition assumes that all the consumer and required ports in a component need to be serviced for a component to be operational, this is not necessarily the case for all components. Some components need only a subset of their consumer and required ports to be functional to be considered operational. Based on the expected behavior of a component, a designer might be able to identify various subsets of consumer and required ports (within the component) that would keep the component operational.
Extensions to the ACM modeling language allow a designer to explicitly model any component's operational requirement. This model is similar to the function-allocation model in that it allows a hierarchical composition of AND/ALT/MofN groups. However, unlike the functionallocation model, the members of the groups in a component operational model include the consumer and required ports of the component. 
Example: implicit COR model
As stated before, the implicit COR assumes that all the consumer and required ports of a component need to be serviced for the component to be operational. In the context of the GPS component (shown in the assembly model in Fig. 2 ), this would mean that the GPS component's consumer port should be serviced by a publisher from the Sensor component. Hence, the implicit requirement for the GPS component to be operational is that the Sensor component be active. The same reasoning applies to the implicit COR for the GPS2 component, which depends on an active Sensor2 component. For the NavDisplay component, the implicit COR relies on both its consumer and required ports being active. Based on the discussions earlier, the consumer port requires EXACTLY(1,GPS, GPS2) and the required port needs ATLEAST(1)(GPS,GP2) components to be active. Since the Sensor and Sensor2 components do not have any consumer or required ports, they do not depend on any other component to be operational.
Example: explicit COR model
To illustrate the explicit specification of a COR, the original NavDisplay component (Fig. 2 ) is slightly modified, as shown in Fig. 6 . The modified NavDisplay component has two required ports (gps1, gps2) as opposed to only one required port (gps) in the original. The assembly model is also similarly modified. In the original assembly model (Fig. 2) , the single required port in NavDisplay is serviced by two provided ports: one in component GPS and the other in component GPS2. In the modified model (Fig. 6) , the required port gps1 is serviced by a provided port in the component GPS, and the required port gps2 is serviced by a provided port in component GPS2.
Additionally, Fig. 7 illustrates an explicit COR for the modified NavDisplay component. It states that the modified NavDisplay component needs EXACTLY(1,gps1, gps2) of the required ports to be serviced. Given the interconnections in the assembly model in Fig. 6 , this implies that the modified Table 3 and Eq. (2) help formalize the semantics associated with the COR model. Table 3 expresses the isActive property of a consumer port, c, and required port, r , in terms of the isActive property of the parent components that service these ports. The isActive property of the consumer port is related to the isActive property of the parent components, P pub , of the publisher ports that service the consumer port(c). The isActive property of the required port, r , is expressed in terms of the isActive property of the parent components, P pro , of the provided ports that service the required port (r ).
Semantics
where f is a generic function, gc i = isActive(c i ), gr i = isActive(r i ), comp is the component, c i refers to the ith consumer port in comp, r i refers to the ith required port in comp.
Equation 2 defines the Component Operational Requirement (COR) criteria for a component comp in terms of the isActive properties of the consumer and required ports in comp. Using the relations defined in Table 3 , it can be inferred that the COR for a component comp, depends on the isActive property of the components containing the publisher and provided ports that service the consumer and required ports in comp.
where comp is a component Furthermore, the isActive property for any component, comp, is implicitly related to the COR criteria for the component (Eq. 3). When the isActive property of a component is set to true, it implies that the component needs to be operational, or its COR property has to be true, which in turn captures the dependency on the isActive property of the components servicing its consumer and required ports. This dependency chain over the isActive property of components in an assembly model can be used to effectively where P pro is the set of parent components of all provided ports connected to required port, r Fig. 8 Allocation model when the COR is considered for the GPS Position function shown in Fig. 4 w.r.t. the assembly in Fig. 3 prune the requirements captured in the function-allocation model. While the explicit COR caters to the generic format of COR captured in Eq. (2), the Implicit Component Requirement has a more specific form captured in Eq. (4). Apart from capturing the main aspect of the implicit COR, i.e., that all (AND Group) of the consumers and required ports in a component be actively serviced, Eq. (4) also captures the redundancy available to serve the consumers and required ports in a component. The exact expression for the isActive property of each consumer and required port in a component can be derived using the equations in Table 3 and the component interaction and dependency information captured in the assembly model. These can then be substituted into Eq. (4) to derive the exact implicit COR expression for each component.
where comp is the component, R set of all required port (r ) in comp, C set of all consumer port (c) in comp. A detailed derivation of the implicit and explicit COR expressions 6 (based on the assembly models in Figs. 2, 6 and explicit COR model in Fig. 7) shows that when CORs are considered, the function-allocation model in Fig. 5 can be substituted with a simpler and precise model in Fig. 8 .
The inclusion of the COR specification ensures that the function-allocation model can focus on the core component(s) and the redundancy available for meeting the requirement. The additional dependency of these core components can be inferred from the assembly model using the explicit COR model (if specified) or by deriving the implicit operational requirement constraint. The designer should exercise due care to ensure that the explicit or implicit operational constraints capture the core requirements and redundancies 6 See technical report [32] .
correctly. The implicit C O R constraints are derived only for those components where the explicit C O R constraint is not specified.
This section explained in detail the modeling concepts introduced to support the deliberative search-based mitigation strategy. While the model of system functions and goals helps define the services desired from the software system and capture any dependency between these functions, the function-allocation model bridges the domain of expected functions with the alternate groups of service providers: the components in the software assembly. Finally, the CORs model states the dependencies between the various components (and the associated inherent redundancy present in the assembly model), thereby allowing for a concise specification in the function-allocation model. The next section focuses on the run-time infrastructure that implements the deliberative, search-based mitigation strategy.
Run-time framework
The execution of a deliberative, search-based mitigation strategy requires a run-time framework to capture the inherent relationships between the elements in the design space (functions, groups and components) as well as support search algorithms that identify alternate configurations to restore system functionality. This section details such a run-time framework (Fig. 9 ) deployed in the the SLHM layer of the ACM component assembly.
As outlined in Fig. 9 , the run-time framework performs the following activities:
1. Initialization of a run-time model representing the system goals, function allocation, CORs, and the component assembly models from models created at design time. 
Run-time model
The run-time system to support the deliberative search strategy depends on the information stored in the static models created at design time, including the software component assembly, the system goals, the function allocation, and the COR models. The resulting data structures also need to capture the relationship between the different elements of the models: the functions, the logical groups, and the software components.
The run-time model is stored as a tree, similar to the dependency tree captured in the static models. The root node corresponds to the system's top-level functions, and the initial tree structure mimics the functional decomposition model. Thereafter, the tree is further expanded by traversing each function-allocation model in a top-down fashion. This allows the run-time model (tree) to grow and to incorporate nodes that correspond to the logical groups (AND/ ALT/ MofN) and finally include the nodes that correspond to the compo- Figure 10 is representative of a portion of the tree that would be constructed for the assembly in Fig. 2 based on the system goals captured in Fig. 4 and function-allocation model described in Fig. 5 . Furthermore, during the initialization process, the runtime model includes information pertaining to the CORs for each component. If available, the explicit COR model is used. Otherwise, the implicit COR model is generated with nodes for the logical groups based on the expressions in Eq. (4) and Table 3 . Finally, each COR model is linked to the rest of the run-time model by parsing the component port interaction information captured in the assembly model.
Each node in the run-time model includes two Boolean attributes that correspond to the is Active and isU sable properties mentioned in the previous sections. The isActive attribute captures the current state of the node: whether the node is currently active and if it is contributing to the system functions. In the case of a component, the is Active Boolean attribute depends on its execution mode in the software component framework. For a logical group, the is Active property corresponds to whether any configuration based on the group contributes to any functionality. In the case of the function nodes, the is Active property captures whether the functionality is currently being provided by the system. The isU sable attribute reflects whether the node is able to provide service. In the case of a component, this corresponds to a component not having a fault. In case of a group node, the isU sable property depends on the isU sable property of its child nodes and whether they contain one or more component configurations that can provide the required service. Finally, in the case of a function node, the isU sable property reflects whether the functionality can be provided by the system. During the initialization of the run-time model, the value of the is Active attribute of each component node is based on the initial execution mode of the component in the assembly model. The isU sable property of each component node is initialized to true. The assumption is that during initialization, the components are not faulty. The is Active and isU sable properties of the nodes that correspond to the logical groups (AND, ALT, MofN) are evaluated based on the relations described in Tables 1 and 2 , using the value of the Boolean attributes of the child nodes. For the purpose of evaluating these attributes in the function nodes, the functions are treated as AND groups. These values are updated in a bottom-up fashion in the run-time model.
The next section deals with the reasoning process that handles the updates from the diagnoser and evaluates alternate configurations to restore the functionality.
The deliberative reasoner
The Deliberative Reasoner uses the run-time model to identify alternate configurations that can restore the affected functionality. Figure 11 provides an outline of the algorithm that includes three steps: Init, Solve, and Update, and it shows the names of the procedures that are used in each step. A detailed discussion on the algorithm and the associated procedures can be found in [16] .
Inlit
This step updates the run-time model based on the fault information. The procedures MarkFaulty and VisitParent ( [16] ) are used during this process. Procedure MarkFaulty sets the is Active and isU sable attributes of the faulty component node (in the run-time model) to false and invokes the Procedure VisitParent, which recursively traverses the graph bottom-up (child to parent) to evaluate and update the is Active and isU sable properties of each node. The recursive update ends when the isU sable property of a node continues to remain true. Such nodes are referred to as reconfiguration nodes and used in the next step.
Solve
This step attempts to identify an alternate configuration. It uses the Procedure Reconfig ( [16] ). The Procedure Reconfig starts from a reconfiguration node identified in the previous step (Init) and recursively traverses the graph topdown (parent to child) through the nodes that are still usable (isU sable = true) to identify a new set of component nodes that can be activated (by setting the is Active property to true).
Update
This step uses the Procedure ReconfigStop to update the runtime model to reflect the reconfigured system. The procedure ReconfigStop is invoked on each of the component nodes whose is Active property is true, starting first with the components identified in the previous step (Solve). A recursive traversal is performed to identify whether the node is contributing to any useful service; if it is not, it is deactivated (is Active = f alse). This is used to deactivate components that are not faulty, but do not contribute to any functionality in the new configuration.
Mitigation commands
The altered state of components in the run-time model is used to generate mitigation or reconfiguration commands. These commands include:
1. START Instructs a component to switch to the active mode. This command is issued when a component's is Active property has changed to true. 2. STOP Instructs a component to switch to the inactive mode. This command is issued when a component's is Active property has changed to false. 3. RESET Instructs a component to reinitialize itself. This command is issued when a component is faulty and an alternate configuration cannot be identified to restore functionality. 4. REWIRE (ri,pc) Instructs a component to rewire its receptacle Interface (ri) and connect it to the appropriate provided interface in another component (pc). This command is issued when the component that hosted the original provided port is switched to inactive mode.
The deliberative reasoner and constraint solvers
The problem of identifying alternate configurations to restore the system functionality can be posed as a constraint satisfaction problem (CSP) that can be solved by external offthe-shelf constraint solvers. One way of dealing with large Boolean search spaces that has become very efficient in recent years is to use Boolean satisfiability (SAT) solvers [19] . Modern SAT solvers can efficiently solve problems containing 1,000 of variables and 10 of 1,000 of clauses. Another approach is to use pseudo-Boolean satisfiability solvers, which are similar to SAT solvers but can handle cardinality constraints over the Boolean variables. Yet another approach is to encode the problem as an integer linear arithmetic problem and use an SMT solver [36] to find a solution.
The run-time framework is designed in a way that allows the Deliberative Reasoner to be extended to use external solvers easily. Figure 9 shows the additional steps that can be added to the Deliberative Reasoner to use a solver. These steps are discussed in the following.
Problem encoding
This step involves identifying the variables and their associated constraints, and translating these into the domain of the external solver. In our case, the variables and constraints include those identified in the run-time model and their underlying relationships captured in the Equations and Tables in Sect. 4 . Further, the encoded problem accounts for the faulty components as well as the current component states. This is to ensure that the resulting solution does not include the faulty components and is close to the original component configuration.
Execution
This step involves executing an external solver. Integration of an external solver requires access to a C/C++ API. This API is used by the deliberative reasoner to input the satisfiability problem to the solver and retrieve the solution.
Solution decoding
In this step, the resulting solution from the solver is translated to the original problem domain. In our case, this corresponds to setting the is Active and isU sable properties of the nodes in the run-time model based on the solution from the solver.
Once these steps are completed, the Deliberative Reasoner can invoke the Update step (described earlier) to update the run-time mode with the new result, verify, and if required, post-process the result. The following section describes our approach to integrating one specific type of solver, a Boolean Satisfiability (SAT) solver, in the run-time framework.
Deliberative reasoning with a SAT solver
This section describes the process of integrating the Deliberative Reasoner with a SAT solver. This involves generating a Boolean Satisfiability encoding of the original search problem, invoking the solver and decoding the solution (if found) produced by the solver. For practical reasons, modern SAT solvers work with clauses in conjunctive normal form (CNF). The CNF consists of the conjunction (i.e., logical AND) of a set of clauses, where each clause is a disjunction (i.e., logical OR) of literals (Boolean variables). Therefore, using a SAT solver involves (1) encoding the information captured in the run-time model into a set of clauses in CNF, (2) invoking a SAT solver to try to find a satisfying solution, and (3) decoding the solution (if found) from the SAT solver so that the run-time model can be updated and corresponding mitigation commands can be issued.
Identifying variables and their relationships
The run-time model, which is the basis of the Deliberative Reasoner, includes Boolean properties (is Active and isU sable) for the functions, the group nodes in the functionallocation model and the components. In addition, it also includes the information about the component's operational requirement model: the is Active properties of the consumer and requires ports of each component and the group nodes associated with this COR model. Because these variables have Boolean values, they naturally align with a Boolean variable in a satisfiability problem. Table 4 lists these categories of Boolean variables and the associated Boolean expressions are used to evaluate them.
Identifying constraints
The primary set of constraints are expressed over the Boolean variables assigned to the nodes in the function-allocation model: the functions, the logical groups (AND, ALT, MofN) and the components. Each logical group is encoded into one or more Boolean constraints such that the encoding preserves the semantics of the logical grouping (Table 2 ). In the case of function nodes, the constraints are generated by assuming the function to be a logical AND grouping.
The next set of constraints are related to the COR model and the interactions captured in the assembly model. One or more Boolean constraints are generated to capture the implication relationship between the is Active property of a component and its operational requirement expression (Eq. 3). If a component needs to be active (i.e., is Active is set to true), then its corresponding COR expression should be evaluated as being true. This also involves generating the clauses corresponding to the logical groups found in the COR models (Table 3) .
Additional Boolean constraints are imposed based on the functional requirement trees. These translate to a constraint stating that the logical AND of the is Active property of all the root functions should be true (Eq. 6). Further, in a run-time component assembly, when the diagnoser reports that certain components are faulty, this information needs to be encoded as additional constraints. The Boolean variable associated with the is Active property of each faulty component is set to false. i∈R F V f i (6) where R F is the set of root functions, V f i is Boolean variable associated with ith function f i .
Problem encoding: transforming to CNF
The Boolean expressions capturing the relationships between the Boolean variables and the constraints need to be converted into CNF before they are given to a SAT solver. Such a translation of Boolean expressions into CNF is discussed in [52] . Our problem includes three additional relations, MofN, ALT and Implies, which are translated into CNF using the same encoding techniques described in [52] ; we provide an overview below. We note that the encodings presented below for ALT and MofN are straightforward and that alternate encodings, such as the ones based on techniques described in [20, 5, 33] , may be able to reduce the number of required clauses. The encodings below are presented for completeness; we are exploring more efficient encodings as part of our future work.
Handling ALT
While some SAT solvers have special constructs to express ALT directly, this is not supported by most solvers. Hence, the ALT expressions are translated into CNF in the following way. Intermediate Boolean variables are introduced, each of which represents a distinct valid combination of variables that can satisfy the ALT. Equation 8 lists the n intermediate Boolean variables introduced and their distinct valid combination (conjunction) for a successful outcome of the ALT expression 7 with n components (comp 1 , comp 2 , . . . , comp n ). Note that each of the expressions captured by the intermediate variables allows exactly one child node to be true, while all other child nodes are expected to be false. The disjunction of these intermediate Boolean variables (Eq. 9) is an equivalent Boolean expression that replaces the original ALT expression (Eq. 7). Since this expression (Eq. 9) involves only conjunctions and disjunctions, it can be easily transformed into the CNF format using the strategies discussed in [52] .
Handling MofN
For MofN, at least M out of the N child nodes should be true. 
Handling implication
In the case of the implies operator, an implication constraint exists between the component's is Active property and the component's operational requirement condition (Eq. 5). This implication relationship between the Boolean variables V comp and V COR comp needs to be expressed in CNF. The CNF translation of this implication constraint is expressed as a Boolean constraint (Eq. 12) that needs to be satisfied by the SAT solver.
Once these transformations are applied to the ALT, MofN and Implies relations, the resulting CNF formula can be handed to the SAT solver.
Execution and decoding the SAT solver results
Once the steps detailed in the previous sub-sections are performed, the SAT solver can be given the following information: (1) the variables (literals) and (2) the relationships and constraints (CNF clauses) capturing the original problem. Two additional pieces of information also need to be encoded and given to the solver before it is started: (1) the faulty components and (2) the current state of the components.
Handling faulty components
It is important that the SAT solver is made aware of faulty components. Otherwise the solution output from the SAT solver could continue to include using the services of the faulty component(s) to achieve the result (i.e., provide services). Additional constraints (clauses) are added to the original problem expressed in CNF to capture the information pertaining to the faulty components. For each faulty component, comp, a clause that captures the constraint expressed in Eq. (13) is added. This tells the SAT solver that the state of this component should be false in the final solution.
¬comp (13) where comp is a faulty component
Handling component states
An additional property that is desired from the SAT solution is that the process of identifying a new solution (for reconfiguration) should take into consideration the current component configuration in the assembly, with the goal that if possible, healthy (non-faulty) and active components that are associated with services that are unaffected should not be reconfigured. The solution should involve minimal reconfiguration if such a path exists. In order to do this, the SAT solver used in this exercise (Cryptominisat v.2.9.1) 7 allows one to specify a set of assumptions for the state of one or more literals (which correspond to the state of the appropriate component). Since there is a one-to-one association between the literals in the defined SAT problem and the is Active property of the components (V comp ), this step involves identifying the literal that corresponds to each healthy active component and adding an assumption to the SAT problem that this literal must be true. The components that are currently stopped or have been detected as faulty are not considered in this process.
Executing the solver and decoding the solution
Once all of the steps above have been performed, the SAT solver can be executed to verify an initial system configuration (the case where there is no fault) or to identify an alternate configuration in the case of a fault. The verification of an initial solution is performed by invoking the SAT solver and setting the assumptions on the Boolean literal corresponding to each active component. If the SAT solver reports that the solution is satisfactory (SAT), then the initial configuration is valid. Otherwise, the SAT solver results need to be analyzed to identify problems either in the initial configuration or in the models. 
V C O R G P S , V C O R G P S2 , V C O R Nav Display V C O Rcomp
Variables corresponding to a component's Operational Requirement.
V dat V c
Variable corresponding to the is Active property of Consumer (dat) in NavDisplay.
V gps V r
Variable corresponding to the is Active property of Required Port (gps) in NavDisplay.
V pos V f
Variable corresponding to the is Active property of GPS Position Function in Function-Allocation Model. * -Category is described in Table 4 .
Whenever a fault report is obtained from the diagnosis engine, an additional clause based on Eq. (13) is added for each faulty component. Also, the states of the faulty components are not encoded as assumptions while invoking the SAT solver. The SAT solver is invoked with assumptions only for the states of healthy and active components. The SAT solver results are then analyzed for a reconfiguration solution.
Handling UNSAT solutions
In the case where the SAT solver reports an unsatisfiable problem (UNSAT), then the assumptions given to the SAT solver are relaxed. The SAT solver is queried for the conflicts, and the assumptions pertaining to the literals reported in the conflict are removed. The assumptions for the rest of the healthy and active components are set and the SAT solver is invoked again. In some cases, all of the assumptions may need to be removed. This is because it is possible that for obtaining a valid configuration, all of the currently active components need to be deactivated and a completely new set of components needs to be activated. However, it is also possible that after removing all assumptions, the solver still reports an UNSAT solution. In such cases, this implies that there is no redundant configuration that can restore the functionality, and the only possible mitigation action is to reset the faulty component(s).
Handling SAT solutions
When the SAT solver returns with an output indicating satisfiability (SAT), the results from the SAT solver can be used to reconfigure the system. The one-to-one correspondence between the literals in the SAT solver problem and the Boolean variables associated with the component states (the is Active property) allows for direct application of the SAT solver solution. The SAT solver results are used to update the component states (is Active property) in the run-time model as if the results were obtained from the Reconfig procedure of the Deliberative Reasoner. The update algorithm is run on the entire model so that the is Active property of each node is updated. At this point, the ReconfigStop procedure is also invoked to identify any component that is active but not contributing to any functionality. Such components are marked to be deactivated. This can happen in SAT solver solutions because a valid solution may include a component which is active, but whose parent groups are not active because the required set of child components is not active. Finally, all the components where the is Active properties have changed are identified and appropriate mitigation commands issued. Additionally, mitigation commands for rewiring required interfaces are also sent.
Smaller examples
This section illustrates the approach of using a SAT solver within the Deliberative Reasoner through simple examples.
Example 1
The example deals with the assembly model in Fig. 2 configured with the goals described in the system goals model in Fig. 4 and the function-allocation model described in Fig. 8 . The Boolean variables associated with the SAT problem are listed in Table 5 . The detailed expression for each component's operational requirement and its transformation based on the ALT and implies relationships can be found in a technical report [32] .
Satisfy:V pos
Subject to :
Equation 14 captures the final set of formulas in CNF that are given to the SAT solver. Each line in this formula captures a relation that needs to be true. The set of formulas (Listing 14) were input to a SAT solver and the assumptions related to the initial system state were set. This included setting the literals associated with all component nodes except GPS2 to true. This was because the GPS2 component was set to semiactive execution mode, while the rest of the components were set to active mode.
As a first step, the external engine (SAT solver) was invoked to verify that the system state based on the initial component configurations can provide the required functionality. Once this was confirmed, the next step involved testing the reconfiguration after injecting a fault.
A fault was introduced in the Sensor component. This was correctly diagnosed by the Diagnosis Engine component and resulted in the Deliberative Reasoner being triggered. An additional constraint (¬V Sensor ), reflecting the non-availability of the faulty sensor component, was added to the set of clauses in Eq. (14) . The current state of the healthy components (GPS, NavDisplay and Sensor2) was fed as a set of assumptions to the SAT solver. The SAT solver produced a SAT solution with a configuration that involved turning off the Sensor and GPS components and activating the GPS2 component, while retaining the active state of the Sensor2 and NavDisplay components
The reconfiguration commands from the Deliberative Reasoner were:
1. STOP Sensor, STOP GPS 2. START GPS2 3. REWIRE NavDisplay: New Provider GPS2.
The resulting configuration was able to restore the functionality. This exercise demonstrated a simple example of using the Deliberative Reasoner with a SAT solver to reproduce the results obtained using the native Deliberative Reasoner discussed in [16] . Further, this example used a more concise function-allocation model and derived the COR relations from the assembly model.
Example 2
In this example, the Deliberative Reasoner with a SAT solver is tested on a more complicated model. The assembly model is described in Fig. 12 . The functionallocation model and component operational model are shown in Fig. 13 . Track-Function1 and Track-Function2 (in Fig. 13 ) are the services required to satisy the system goals. The complication in this model is brought about by the ALT Groups. For the ALT group to be active, exactly one of its (Table 2 ). More importantly, this example (Fig. 13) includes a component, GPS2 , that is contained in two ALT Groups (ALT Group1 and ALT Group2), each of which has to be active to satisfy the system goals (Track-Function1 and Track-Function2).
The initial system state is as follows:
* Active Components Sensor1, Sensor2, Sensor3, GPS1, GPS3, NavDislay1 and NavDisplay2. * Active Functions TrackFunction1, TrackFunction2, and Tracking. * Stopped Components GPS2. * RMI Wiring NavDisplay2 to GPS3, and NavDisplay1 to GPS1.
The Deliberative Reasoner with SAT was able to verify the initial state of the system. A fault was introduced in the Sensor3 component. The Deliberative Reasoner using the SAT solver issued the following reconfiguration commands: 4. REWIRE NavDisplay2 to GPS2. 5. REWIRE NavDisplay1 to GPS2.
Upon reconfiguration, the system state was as follows:
* Active Components Sensor2, GPS2, NavDislay1, and NavDisplay2. * Faulty Components Sensor3. * Stopped Components Sensor1, Sensor3, GPS1, and GPS3 * Active Functions TrackFunction1, TrackFunction2, and Tracking. * RMI Wiring NavDisplay2 to GPS2, and NavDisplay1 to GPS2.
It can be seen that the reconfiguration solution obeys the ALT constraint. It switches off the faulty component Sensor3 and GPS3 that relies on Sensor3. Further, to satisfy the ALT constraint it switches off GPS1 and activates GPS2. Furthermore, it switches off the Sensor1 component as its services are no longer required.
A larger case study: IMU
We use a larger example of an inertial measurement unit (IMU) to present further details about the Deliberative Reasoner. An IMU is a software assembly that uses accelerometers and GPS units to track the inertial position in an avionics system. 8 The IMU assembly (see Fig. 14) includes redun- 8 See technical report [17] for a detailed discussion. 
Air data inertial reference unit (ADIRU)
The IMU system includes a primary and a backup ADIRU subsystem. The architecture of the ADIRU subsystem (see Fig. 15 ) is based on the ADIRU used on a Boeing 777 aircraft [34, 48] . It includes six accelerometer components, four ADIRU Processor components and three Voter components. Each accelerometer component publishes data to all the four ADIRU processors by reading an emulated sensor. Each ADIRU processor uses a set of linear regression equations to periodically estimate the body acceleration and publish it to the voter components. Each voter component votes upon the body-axis estimate of the ADIRU processors and publishes the result to the Primary Flight Computer (PFC) components.
GPS subsystem
The IMU system includes a primary and backup GPS subsystem (Fig. 16 ) which consists of two components. The GPS receiver component emulates a software sensor providing the hardware readout to the GPS processor component that implements a Kalman Filter. On each update, the GPS processor notifies the PFC components. 
Primary flight computer (PFC) subsystem
The PFC subsystem shown in Fig. 17 emulates the flight computer which uses the body acceleration data fed by the ADIRU to track the airplane's inertial position. The IMU system is configured with three PFC subsystems: left, right, and center-that actively receive the input from a Voter component in the ADIRU subsystem (see Fig. 14) . Given that the inertial system using the body acceleration values tends to drift over time, the PFC NavFilter component uses a receptacle port to fetch the more accurate but slowly refreshing GPS data.
Display subsystem
The Pilot and Co-Pilot Display subsystems (Fig. 18) receive update notifications from the three PFC subsystems. The Display component periodically fetches the updated data (through its required ports) from each of the PFC components and displays a median value.
System goals for IMU
The IMU system goal (see Fig. 19 ) was to provide inertial tracking functionality. Inertial tracking depends on determining gps position as well as position tracking. Position tracking, in turn, depends on the ability of the system to determine the body acceleration. 
Function allocation in IMU
The mathematical relations that capture the functionallocation models in the IMU system are listed below.
* The GPS Position functionality requires exactly one of the GPS subsystems, i.e., G P S Position → EXACTLY(1, Primar y, Secondar y G P Ssubsystem). * The Position tracking functionality requires at least one of the PFC subsystems, i.e., PositionT racking → ATLEAST(1)(Le f t, Center, Right P FC Subsystem). * The Body acceleration functionality requires exactly one of the ADIRU subsystems, i.e., Body Acceleration → EXACTLY(1, Primar y, Secondar y AD I RU subsystem).
Component operational requirements in IMU
The following are the explicitly specified CORs in the IMU system. * The Display component needs at least one of its consumers to be active: → ATLEAST(1)(le f t, right, center) consumer. * The ADIRU Processor component requires at least 4 of its 6 consumers to be active : → ATLEAST(4)(Allconsumer s). * The Voter component in the ADIRU subsystem requires at least 2 of its 4 consumers to be active : → ATLEAST(4)(Allconsumer s).
The operational requirement for the other components is derived implicitly using Eq. (4).
Redundant configurations in IMU
The IMU subsystem includes 9 subsystems (2 ADIRU subsystems, 2 GPS subsystems, 3 PFC subsystems and, 2 Display subsystems) with a total of 40 components between them. Based on the function-allocation and COR models, the number of alternate configurations can be identified as follows:
* 2 alternate configurations support GPS Position functionality (using Primary or Secondary GPS subsystem). * 7 Alternate configurations support Position Tracking functionality (At least 1 of the 3 PFC subsystems needs to be active, i.e., 3 C 3 + 3 C 2 + 3 C 1 ) = 7). * 2 Alternate configurations support Body Acceleration functionality (Primary or Secondary ADIRU). * 37 Alternate configurations of the accelerometer components in each ADIRU subsytem (4 of the 6 accelerometers required, i.e., 6 C 6 + 6 C 5 + 6 C 4 ) = 37). * 17 Alternate configurations of the ADIRU processor components in each ADIRU subsystem (2 of the 4 processors required, i.e., 4 C 4 + 4 C 3 + 4 C 2 = 17).
The total possible configurations is a product of the number of alternate configurations available in each case above, i.e., 17612 (=2*7*2*37*17).
IMU health management using deliberative reasoner with a SAT solver
The whole IMU assembly was deployed on four hosts using one core clocked at 2.4 GHz in each hosts. The SLHM components associated with the assembly were deployed on a separate dedicated core. A Deliberative Reasoner with a SAT solver 9 was used to identify alternative configurations to 9 http://www.msoos.org/cryptominisat2/,v2.9.1.
mitigate fault effects and restore the IMU functionality. The CNF encoding for the IMU system included 493 variables and 1776 clauses. The system was initialized with the components in the following subsystems set to active mode: Primary ADIRU, Primary GPS, All PFCs and all Display subsystems. The secondary GPS and ADIRU subsystems were set to inactive mode. The initial configuration was verified using the SAT solver in 4.228 ms. Thereafter, the above setup was tested for a specific fault scenario. The sequence of faults, the time for computing reconfiguration commands for each fault and the reconfiguration commands issued after each fault are listed in Table 6 . When the first fault is triggered (Accelerometer6 in Primary ADIRU subsystem), the reconfiguration engine correctly identified a solution with minimal reconfiguration (see Sect. 6.4) to restore the functionality. In this case, the faulty component (Accelerometer6) is turned off. It did the same when another accelerometer turned faulty (Accelerometer5), as the ADIRU can tolerate up to two accelerometer faults. When the third accelerometer failed (Accelerometer4), the reconfiguration engine correctly identified that the Primary ADIRU was no longer capable of supporting the desired functionality and switched to using the secondary ADIRU subsystem. In the case of the fault in the GPS component, the reconfiguration engine switched to the Secondary GPS subsystem and rewired the PFCs to use the provided ports in the Secondary GPS subsystem.
Deliberative reasoning using a Pseudo-Boolean solver
This section describes the process of integrating the Deliberative Reasoner with a pseudo-Boolean (PB) solver [20] .
As in the case of integrating with a SAT solver (Sect. 6), this involves (1) translating the information captured in the runtime model into a set of pseudo-Boolean clauses, (2) invoking a PB solver to try to find a satisfying solution, and (3) decoding the solution (if found) from the PB solver back into the run-time model and issuing the appropriate mitigation commands.
7.1 Encoding for using PB solvers PB solvers are extensions to SAT solvers. In addition to handling regular Boolean Satisfiability constraints, they can also handle cardinality constraints over Boolean variables. The variables and constraints that need to be input to the PB solver are exactly the same as the ones described in the case of SAT solver (see Sects. 6.1 and 6.2). The encodings for the AND groups, functions, CORs, faulty components and component states are quite similar and can be derived from the CNF encodings presented in Sect. 6.3. However, the pseudoBoolean encoding for the ALT and MofN groups is much simpler. The following paragraphs describe the PB encoding for each of these cases.
Handling AND
The PB encoding for handling the AND relation between two variables V 1 and V 2 is captured by the inequalities in 15, where V a represents the AND relation itself. Equation 16 captures the corresponding CNF encoding. The one-to-one relationship between the two translations is evident. The PB encoding for an AND relation involving N variables-V 1 , V 2 , . . . , V N -is captured by the inequalities in 17.
Handling ALT
The encoding of the ALT groups is greatly simplified in the case of PB solvers. An ALT relationship between N variables-V 1 , V 2 , . . . , V N -is captured by Eq. (18), where V a represents the ALT relation (V a is true if and only if the ALT relation is satisfied). 
Maximal activation in MofN
While the MofN relation described above captures the requirement that a minimum of M nodes are required to satisfy an MofN relation, we are interested in a maximal solution, i.e., when an MofN node is active, we want to activate as many of its child nodes as possible. This is enforced through a minimization constraint supported by PB solvers. Equation 20 captures the minimization constraint for each MofN, where V a , V 1 , V 2 , . . . , V N represent the state of the variables in Eq. (19) .
Handling implies
The PB encoding for the implies relationship between the is Active property of a component and its COR is similar to its CNF encoding (Formula 12); the PB encoding is shown in Eq. (21), where V comp and V C O R comp represent the is Active property and COR for a component comp, respectively.
Handling faulty components
An additional clause (Eq. 22) is added for each faulty component comp.
Handling component states
As in the case of SAT solvers, the component states are provided to the PB solver as assumptions. The literals corresponding to the healthy active components are set to true.
Handling functions and solutions
As in the case of the CNF encoding, the AND relationship described in Eq. (17) is used to capture the inter-dependencies between the functions (in the system goal model) as well as the relationships between the root functions and the solution variable (V s ). The constraint on the solution variable, V s is expressed by the Eq. (23).
The relations captured in this section were used to set up the pseudo-Boolean problem for illustrative examples similar to those in Sect. 6.5. A pseudo-Boolean solver, MINISAT +10 , was used to solve the problem. The resulting solutions captured the correct reconfiguration strategies, and a more detailed discussion of these results is planned as future work.
Discussion and future work
The search process of the native Deliberative Reasoner (summarized in Sect. 5.2, discussed in detail in [16] ) is rather simple and straightforward. The search process is very effective, in that it deals only with the affected portion of the graph and performs a local search as close as possible to the affected nodes in the original configuration.
In certain scenarios, such as the exclusivity relationship imposed by ALT groups, the SAT solver is useful, as demonstrated by the results of the examples in the previous sections. Setting an assumption on the literals associated with the active-healthy components allows us to direct the SAT solver to find an existing solution that does not affect the functioning parts of the system. The encoding for the pseudoBoolean solvers (presented in Sect. 7) is much more direct and simple than the CNF encoding for the SAT solvers. This is especially true for the MofN relation. Our tests, thus far on simple illustrative examples, have been very promising, and we plan to test this approach on larger systems. We are also exploring the use of other solvers, such as SMT solvers [36] .
Our current approach lacks the ability to use a solver selectively for a subset of the problem. For example, it is possible to extend the approach and formulate the problem so that it deals exclusively with the functions and groups that are related to the affected components (those affected due to discovered faults). This can improve scalability in very large systems.
Additionally, the current approach uses either the Solve step of the Deliberative Reasoner or uses an external solver for the entire problem. If the problem can be broken down through offline analysis or analysis at initialization time, it should be possible to use an array of solvers for the different parts of the problem. The hybrid approach could also involve abstracting the problem sent to the external solver, so that the simpler native Deliberative Reasoning approach is used to post-process additional results based on the configuration supplied by the external solver.
Apart from solutions that enhance run-time performance, additional tools to help at design time should be created as well. These tools can help verify the consistency of the system on an incremental basis so that problems with the design-time specifications can be fixed.
Related research
The work described in this paper generally falls into two categories (a) run-time monitoring and (b) self-adaptive software systems. The difference clearly lies in monitoring and detection vs. monitoring and detection and mitigation. The work presented in this paper is focusing primarily on the mitigation aspects. However, it uses our work in the area of monitoring, detection, and fault isolation.
Run-time monitoring and detection
Methods for run-time detection of faults can be classified either as acceptance-based testing, or comparison-based testing. The former involves monitoring a component or subsystem with respect to some acceptance criteria, while the latter uses multiple executions whose results are then compared. Pike et al. described the Copilot run-time monitor for periodic tasks in embedded systems in [40] . They described their approach for establishing a run-time monitoring framework where monitors can be scheduled by integrating the monitor executions in the system schedule such that all the task deadlines are still satisfied. They provided a domain-specific language for creating the monitors.
Jagadeesan and Viswanathan provided a formal discussion on observing properties in a system at run-time in [24] . They made a distinction between two kinds of run-time verification: active testing and passive testing. In the former, the observations of timed event traces are made from the initial state, while in the latter, observations of the system are obtained mid-stream. They identified that a property can be tested passively (i.e., it is acceptable to not observe the events all the time) if and only if it is prefix-closed and suffix-closed. The properties to be tested are modeled as a timed automaton. They also provided an example system in which the passive properties are checked using UPPAAL [7] by checking if the composition of timed automaton generated by the observed trace and the property timed automaton is empty or not.
Goldberg and Horvath [22] discussed discrepancy monitoring in the context of the health management architecture supported by ARINC-653. They described extensions to the application executive component, software instrumentation and a temporal logic run-time framework. Their method primarily depends on modeling the expected timed behavior of a process, a partition or a core module-the different levels of fault-protection layers. All behavior models contain "faulty states" which represent the violation of an expected property. They associated mitigation functions using callbacks with each fault. Sammapun et al. described a run-time verification approach for properties written in a timed variant of Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) called MEDL in [44] . They described an architecture called RT-MaC for checking the properties of a target program during run-time. All properties are evaluated based on a sequence of observations made on a "target program". To make these observations, all target programs are modified to include a "filter" that generates the interesting event and reports values to the event recognizer. The event recognizer is a module that forwards the events to a checker that can check the property. Timing properties are checked using watchdog timers on the machines executing the target program. The main difference in this approach and the approach of Goldberg and Horvath outlined in the previous paragraph is that RT-MaC supports an "until" operator that allows the specification of a time bound where a given property must hold. Both of these works provided us with valuable input and influenced the design of our run-time Component Level Health Management.
Wang et al. [54] described an online algorithm for checking past LTL properties of system execution. However, they allowed uncertainty in observations by noting that the recorder might not capture the precise time the observations had occurred in the past.
Comparison-based anomaly detection
Comparison-based detection schemes involve either executing the same component twice or executing at least three redundant units with a voting component. The comparison can be based on either exact agreement or approximate agreement, i.e., on all values being within a small distance of each other.
Laprie [26, 27] described different types of redundancy to detect different types of faults that can be captured by executing the software component twice. A point to note is that (binary) comparison-based approaches can be used for detection but not masking. Moreover, they are susceptible to floating point precision errors. Theoretical analysis shows that at least three redundant units and a voter (3 + 1) are required to mask the detected fault. The categories listed below include the main variants; however, it must be noted that the overall approach appears to be more focused towards hardware faults.
Time-based redundancy
It executes the same software component twice but during two different time intervals. The main idea is that by comparing the two results separated by time, one can detect discrepancies caused by transient hardware faults that live for an interval shorter than the time elapsed between two executions. This approach will, however, lead to false positives when the component's output is dependent on the time of execution.
Hardware-based redundancy
It executes the same software component on two different hardware units. This can detect a transient or permanent hardware fault in any one of the units. It will not work when both hardware units fail in a similar way and cause the software to produce the same output.
Using diverse software on same hardware
Using of diverse software on same hardware executes different versions of software on the same hardware across two different time intervals. This can catch faults that are introduced during implementation, although not common errors in the specification (discussed later). It can also detect transient hardware faults. This technique will produce false positives if the software output is time dependent.
Using diverse software on diverse hardware
Using of diverse software on diverse hardware executes different versions of software on independent hardware units. The comparison will detect faults due to design errors that generate different outputs in the different versions as well as any faults in the hardware.
9.3 Self-adaptive software systems
The work described here fits in the general area of selfadaptive software systems, for which a research road map has been presented in [11] . Our approach focuses on latent faults in software systems, follows a component-based architecture with a model-based development process and implements all steps in the collect-analyze-decide-act loop.
One notable approach to system health management for physical systems is to design a controller that inherently drives the system back into a safe region upon a system failure. This is the basis of the goal-based control paradigm [56] that supports a deductive controller responsible for observing the plant's state (mode estimation) and issuing commands to move the plant through a sequence of states that achieves the specified goal. This approach inherently provides fault recovery using the control program to set an appropriate configuration goal that negates the problems caused by faults in the physical system. However, these control algorithms are themselves typically implemented in software and are therefore reliant on the fault-free behavior of related software components.
Conmy et al. presented a framework for certifying integrated modular avionics applications built on top of the ARINC-653 platform in [12] . Their main approach was the use of 'safety contracts' to validate the system at design time. They defined the relationship between two or more components within a safety-critical system. However, they did not present any details on the nature of these contracts and how they can be specified. We believe that a similar approach can be taken to formulate acceptance criteria in terms of "correct" value-domain and temporal-domain properties that will let us detect any deviation in a component's behavior.
Nicholson presented the concept of reconfiguration in integrated modular systems running on operating systems that provide robust spatial and temporal partitioning in [38] . He identified that health monitoring is crucial for a safetycritical software system, and that in the future, it will be necessary to trade redundancy-based fault tolerance for the ability of "reconfiguration on failure" while still operational. He described one possibility to achieve this goal using a set of lookup tables, similar to the health monitoring tables used in the ARINC-653 system specification, that map a trigger event to a set of system blueprints providing the mapping functions. Furthermore, he identified that this kind of reconfiguration is more amenable to failures that happen gradually, indicated by parameter deviations.
Rohr et al. [43] advocated the use of architectural models for self-management. They suggested the use of a runtime model to reflect the system state and provided reconfiguration functionality. From a development model, they generated a causal graph over various possible states of its architectural entities. At the core of their approach, they used specifications based on UML to define constraints, as well as monitoring and reconfiguration operations at development time.
Garlan et al. [21] and Dashofy et al. [13] have proposed an approach which bases system adaptation on architectural models representing the system as a composition of several components, their interconnections and properties of interest. Their work follows the theme of Rohr et al., where architectural models are used at run-time to track system state and make reconfiguration decisions using rule-based strategies.
While these works focus on the structural part of selfmanaging computing components, others have emphasized the need for behavioral modeling of the components. For example, Zhang et al. described an approach to specify the behavior of adaptable programs in [58] . Their approach is based on separating the adaptation behavior specification from the non-adaptive behavior specification in autonomic computing software. They modeled the source and target models for the program using Statecharts and then specified an adaptation model, i.e., the model for the adaptation set connecting the source model to the target model using a variant of LTL [57] .
Williams's research [42] concentrates on model-based autonomy. The paper suggests that an emphasis should be placed on developing techniques to enable software to recognize that it has failed and to recover from the failure. Their technique lies in the use of a Reactive Model-based Programming Language (RMPL) [55] for specifying both correct and faulty behavior of the software components. They also use high-level control programs [56] for guiding the system to the desirable behaviors.
Later, the focus has started to shift towards formalizing concepts of self-management in software engineering. In [28] , Lightstone suggested that systems should be made "just sufficiently" self-managing and should not have any unnecessary complicated functions. Shaw proposed a practical process control approach for autonomic systems in [47] . The author maintained that several dependability models commonly used in autonomic computing are impractical because they require precise specifications that are difficult to obtain. It is suggested that practical systems should use development models that include the variability and uncertainty inherent in the environment. Additionally, the development methods should not pursue absolute correctness regarding adaption, but instead should focus on the fitness for the intended task, or sufficient correctness. Several authors have also considered the application of traditional requirements engineering to the development of autonomic computing systems [8, 50] .
The work described here is closely related to the larger field of software fault tolerance: principles, methods, techniques and tools that ensure that a system can survive software defects that manifest themselves at run-time [30, 41] . Arguably, our approach comes closest to dynamic software fault removal, performed at run-time. The overall architecture presented in this paper shows a specific implementation of the functions needed to perform this task.
Conclusion
This paper presented the design, implementation, and results of a deliberative, search-based strategy to restore the health of a software system. The three key design-time concepts are: (1) the system goals model, (2) the functional redundancy and allocation model, and (3) the implicit and explicit COR model. We described the semantics associated with each aspect of the individual models and used illustrative examples to derive the associated relationships. We presented key aspects of the run-time framework in detail, including the automatic generation of the run-time model from the static design-time specifications, the workings of the deliberative reasoner and the integration with external off-the-shelf solvers. The inherent workflow and the inter-relationship between the run-time elements was also described. Both Boolean and pseudo-Boolean Satisfiability encodings for the reconfiguration problem were presented. Real-time and online reconfiguration using the Deliberative Reasoner with an external Boolean Satisfiability Solver (CryptoMiniSat) was successfully demonstrated on both illustrative examples and a realistic case study from the avionics domain.
